Chapter TWO
Plantinga’s Early Religious Epistemology
Introduction
The purpose of Chapter One was to place Plantinga’s religious epistemology in context by
identifying themes which have influenced the development of his religious epistemology. The purpose of
this chapter is also contextual. In this chapter I will discuss Plantinga’s early religious epistemology with
the purpose of better understanding Plantinga’s current proposal by placing it in the context of his
previous work. Plantinga’s mature religious epistemology, as seen in Warranted Christian Belief, should
not be considered in isolation from his earlier work on this topic. Instead, it is the culmination of a
project began in God and Other Minds and continued in ‘Reason and Belief in God’ (to mention only
Plantinga’s major works on this topic). Consequently, many of the fundamental insights in Plantinga’s
current religious epistemology are present (even if inchoately or in less developed guise) in these earlier
works.
Since my topic is Plantinga’s current religious epistemology, I will not linger over the many
important and interesting discussions and critiques of Plantinga’s early religious epistemology. Neither
will I attempt to articulate my own critique of his early work.1 Rather I will focus on the development of
Plantinga’s religious epistemology. As such, I will consider only those critiques which shed light on both
the continuity and the discontinuity between Plantinga’s early and mature thought on this topic.
For the purpose of organization, I will divide Plantinga’s work on religious epistemology into
three periods or ‘stages.’ Plantinga’s first publication on religious epistemology, God and Other Minds,2
published in 1967, comprises Stage I.3 These first seeds of Plantinga’s ‘Reformed epistemology’ bore
fruit during Stage II. The result was a series of articles that together led up to the publication of ‘Reason
and Belief in God’ in 1983.4 The final stage of Plantinga’s religious epistemology emerged slowly.

My critique of Plantinga’s early religious epistemology is sketched in ‘Rationality, Warrant,
and Religious Diversity,’ Philosophia Christi (old series) 17 (1994) 1-14.
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The dates of these ‘stages’ are the dates of publication. Of course, Plantinga finished the
material in God and Other Minds prior to 1967. For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to the date of
publication, not the approximate date of writing, unless it is necessary to do so.
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Some of the shape of this transition was seen 1987 with the publication of ‘Justification and Theism.’5 In
1993 Plantinga published the first two volumes of his Warrant trilogy, Warrant: The Current Debate and
Warrant and Proper Function,6 which laid out his theory of knowledge, and in 2000 Plantinga published
Warranted Christian Belief which applied that theory of knowledge to belief in God.7 In this chapter, I
will discuss Stages I and II, with greater emphasis given to Stage II. Stage III will be the topic of the next
chapter.

Stage I: God and Other Minds (1967)
The central topic of God and Other Minds (hereafter GOM) is ‘the rational justification of belief in the
existence of God as He is conceived in the Hebrew-Christian tradition.’8 In GOM, Plantinga develops a
careful and sustained argument for a startling conclusion: belief in God can neither be proved nor
disproved. To defend this assertion he subjects the traditional arguments for God’s existence
(cosmological, ontological, teleological) and the most common arguments against God’s existence (the
Problem of Evil, Verificationism, Mackie’s Paradox of Omnipotence, and Findlay’s Ontological
Disproof) to rigorous analysis and concludes that they all fail. In the absence of traditional modes of
establishing/denying God’s existence, Plantinga compares the epistemic status of belief in God to the
epistemic status of other beliefs, particularly beliefs that we have a strong inclination to accept but have
very little non-circular evidential support. The problem of the existence of ‘other minds’ serves as a
paradigm example of such a class of beliefs. No reasonable person doubts the existence of other minds,
but an argument for their existence is extremely hard to articulate and defend. In the course of his
analysis, Plantinga notes that the ‘other minds’ problem displays the same dialectical structure as the
‘theistic arguments’ problem — in both cases the arguments for and against are not persuasive. In fact,
the strongest argument for the existence of God (the teleological argument) and the strongest argument
for the existence of other minds (the analogy argument) both suffer from a similar ‘crucial and crippling
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deficiency.’9 Specifically, both the teleological argument (for God’s existence) and the analogical
argument (for the existence of other minds), which are both inductive arguments, fail because the relevant
evidence in each case (teleological evidence and analogical evidence) supports only some of what is
needed to defend belief in God and belief in other minds.10
Since it seems that belief in God and belief in other minds are in the same epistemological
category, Plantinga argues that belief in God could reasonably be treated just as we treat belief in other
minds. Thus, Plantinga’s ‘tentative’ conclusion, ‘if my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in
God. But obviously the former is rational; so, therefore, is the latter.’11
Plantinga’s conclusion can be summarized in the logical form of modus ponens:
(1) If belief in other minds is rational, so is belief in God.
(2) Belief in other minds is rational.
(3) Therefore, belief in God is rational as well.
The minor premise (2) is uncontroversial and the conclusion (3) obviously follows from the major and
minor premises. The crucial premise, therefore is (1), the major premise. The major premise expresses
what has come to be known as the ‘parity thesis.’ In the previous chapter, I briefly discussed the parity
thesis. It is simply the claim that religious belief is epistemically on par with other widely accepted
beliefs (belief in other minds, the existence of an external world, and that the world has existed for more
than five minutes, etc.). I also suggested that the parity thesis constitutes a major theme in Plantinga’s
thought.12
But what reason do we have for accepting the major premise in Plantinga’s argument, the ‘parity
thesis?’ On the face of it, the parity thesis seems troubling. George Nakhnikian points to a significant
obstacle to Plantinga’s parity thesis in GOM:
The belief in other minds is obviously epistemically rational, and, in light of Plantinga’s
judgments about discursive grounds for the belief, there must be some non-discursive fact that
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Besides Plantinga, the other notable defender of the parity thesis is William Alston. See his
Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

renders belief in other minds epistemically rational. We may not know what it is, but doubtless
there is one. And here’s the rub: there is no comparable guarantee with respect to belief in God.
Unlike belief in other minds, you cannot say that belief in God is just obviously epistemically
rational, and then, given the failure of theistic arguments, infer that there must be
some nondiscursive fact that renders belief in God epistemically rational. For it is not just
obvious that belief in God is epistemically rational.13
Plantinga’s response, I believe, would be: ‘Not just obvious to whom?’ For Plantinga, the parity thesis
calls into question the double standard that has for so long been applied to religious truth claims but not
applied to claims in other areas — certainly not in science, but also not in epistemology, ethics, or even
metaphysics. While he grants that ‘there may be reasons for supposing that although rational belief in
other minds does not require an answer to the epistemological question, rational belief in the existence of
God does,’ he goes on to say that ‘it is certainly hard to see what these reasons might be.’14 However,
Plantinga does not give a positive argument for the parity thesis, and he repeatedly says that his claims
regarding the parity thesis are ‘merely tentative.’15
Plantinga’s argument instead points to the fact that both the teleological argument and the
analogical argument share a common flaw — call it flaw F — and that F is not sufficient to undercut our
reasons to believe in the existence of other minds. Now this fact alone does not suggest that the
teleological argument supports theistic belief, or that there exists any rational support at all for theistic
belief. But it does suggest that in the face of flaws like F — in this case, lack of a decisive argument —
belief in God still can be rational. Consequently, what Plantinga’s argument in GOM does accomplish is
call into question the assumption that only those beliefs which are adequately supported by an argument
are rationally acceptable.
The essence of Plantinga’s argument in GOM, therefore, is that there are a set of beliefs that we
are strongly inclined to accept as ‘epistemically appropriate’ — the paradigm example of which is belief
in the existence of other minds — for which compelling arguments or evidence is lacking. Since some of
what we rationally believe, and even know, is held in the absence of propositional evidence or arguments
— in fact, in the absence of any clear idea of how to go about accruing evidence or building an argument
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for such things — then the evidentialist requirement for belief in God is called into question. Therefore,
even if Plantinga’s argument in GOM does not support the conclusion that theistic belief is rational, or
that theistic belief is on the same epistemic footing as belief in other minds, it does support a rejection (or
at least a strong suspicion) of the evidentialist requirement for belief in God.
Stage II: ‘Reason and Belief in God’ (1983)
I have argued that Plantinga’s central contention in GOM was that the lengthy and august
tradition of natural theology and evidentialism regarding belief in God was mistaken. Just as the absence
of a compelling argument does not disqualify belief in the existence of other minds as a rational belief,
Plantinga suggests the absence of a compelling argument should not disqualify belief in the existence of
God. In the final pages of GOM, however, Plantinga hinted at even a more radical suggestion:
It must be conceded that the theist has no very good answer to the request that he explain his
reasons for believing in the existence of God; at any rate he has no answer that need convince the
skeptic. But must he have or must there be an answer to this question if his theistic belief in God
is reasonable, rationally justifiable: must there be for any proposition p that I rationally believe
(and that is, let us say, contingent and corrigible), a good answer to the ‘epistemological
question’: ‘How do you know that p; what are your reasons for supposing that p is true?’
Presumably not. . . . Then we must conclude, I believe, that a man may rationally hold a
contingent, corrigible belief even if there is no answer to the relevant epistemological question.16
The idea is not only that belief in God need not be based on compelling argument or evidence, but that it
need not be based on arguments or evidence at all. Twelve years later Plantinga addressed this matter
again, this time even more explicitly:
The foundation of my noetic structure is the set of propositions I start with, we might say; and I
properly judge the acceptability of other propositions by their relation to those in this set. And
now the central question is this: why shouldn’t the existence of God be in the foundations of my
noetic structure? Why can’t I properly take G [=’God exists and is omnicompetent’] to be a
member of this set, so that it is one of the propositions with respect to which the plausibility or
acceptability of other propositions . . . is to be judged?17
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This contention, that belief in God need not be based on propositional evidence or argument, as we saw in
the last chapter, is one of the hallmarks of Plantinga’s ‘Reformed Epistemology’:
(RE)

Theistic belief need not be based on propositional evidence in order to have positive
epistemic status.

In Stage II, Plantinga develops this assertion to a much greater degree of complexity than he did
in Stage I. In particular, in ‘Reason and Belief in God’ (hereafter RBG), he devotes significant attention
to the intellectual history behind the denial of RE, the evidentialist assumption that belief in God requires
evidence or arguments to be rational. To understand Plantinga’s defense of RE at this stage, therefore, we
must first look at his critique of evidentialism.

Evidentialism
The perennial target of Plantinga’s animadversions is a view that has been labeled evidentialism.
Evidentialism involves the idea that there are norms for belief and hence people have intellectual duties to
fulfill regarding those norms with respect to their beliefs. Brand Blanshard expresses the evidentialist
dogma very clearly:
Everywhere and always belief has an ethical aspect. There is such a thing as a general ethics of
the intellect. The main principle of that ethic I hold to be the same inside and outside religion.
The principle is simple and sweeping: Equate your assent to the evidence.18
But what kind of evidence is allowable? This is no merely technical question: the issue of
evidentialism hinges crucially on what is allowed to constitute ‘evidence.’ For example, is my experience
of seeing a UFO ‘evidence’ of the existence of UFO’s? It is certainly not obvious that it is, and many
epistemologists have taken great pains to show that such experiences are not ‘evidential’ in any
appropriate sense of the word.19 The crucial issue concerns whether ‘appropriate evidence’ is limited to
that which is at least in principle public (‘believed propositions’ or arguments, for example) or whether it
includes the broader category of mental states (such as perceptual experiences or even personal
insights).20 These are difficult and labyrinthian questions. Happily, since it is Plantinga’s understanding
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of the nature of evidence that is relevant to my project and not the understanding of the nature of
evidence, it is not essential to adjudicate this matter. When Plantinga discusses the nature of the
‘evidence’ required by evidentialism it seems clear that he is construing such evidence as doxastic, as
being limited to ‘believed propositions.’ To indicate this perspective I will refer to such evidence as
‘propositional evidence.’
The view that there exists a duty not to believe without sufficient propositional evidence, of
course, is not new. It has a long and distinguished history — going back at least to John Locke — and it
has been popular ever since, even in our ‘postmodern’ times. Whatever else it is, evidentialism is an
epistemic principle the purpose of which is to make knowledge claims more objective. Consequently,
there is a communal or social intuition behind evidentialism. If I am not in possession of evidence for a
particular belief that is, at least in principle, available to other people who share my epistemic situation,
then the belief in question is judged to be irrational, too ‘subjective’ to be counted as knowledge.
Roderick Chisholm expresses the idea this way:
(1) Anyone having just the evidence in question is justified in accepting the conclusion
(2) I am in the position of having just that evidence
(3) Therefore I am justified in accepting the conclusion.21
Gary Gutting has articulated a similar principle, drawing on the idea that the proper governance of one’s
beliefs relative to the available evidence has important social implications.22 His claim is that the
rationality of my beliefs is connected in an important way with the beliefs of others who share my
‘epistemic situation’ — those whose background knowledge, experiences, and cognitive faculties are
‘sufficiently similar’ to my own. Of course, the idea of ‘sufficiently similar epistemic situations’ requires
further analysis. While the concept of ‘similarity’ is fairly intuitive and relatively unproblematic, what is
significantly more vexing is the application of the idea of similarity to ‘epistemic situations.’ In fact, I am
inclined to wonder if there is such a thing as a ‘sufficiently similar epistemic situations’ for two people,
particularly in matters as complicated as belief in God.
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Setting aside such concerns, I will call a person who is in a sufficiently similar epistemic situation
as I regarding a particular belief my ‘epistemic peer.’ Consider the following situation:
(1) I believe p
(2) S is my epistemic peer; and
(3) S does not believe p.
This problematic has been labeled ‘Gutting’s triad’ by Nicholas Wolterstorff.23 According to Gutting,
when a ‘Gutting triad’ arises for a person with regard to some belief p, they are obligated to ‘either
perform the activity of justifying p, or to try to bring [oneself] to the point of withholding belief in p.’24
It is important to understand the position Gutting is arguing against, the state of affairs he deems
to be epistemically untenable. It is what he calls ‘epistemological egoism’ — the disposition to give
epistemic weight to one’s own beliefs simply because they are one’s own.25 This position has also been
called ‘the privilege of the first person perspective.’26 In arguing against epistemological egoism, Gutting
asks us to
assess the situation from the standpoint of a neutral epistemic observer; that is, an observer who is
as fully informed about the situation as I and my epistemic peers but who is not personally
involved in any way that might improperly affect his judgement. In particular, the neutral
epistemic observer has no intuitions pro or con about p and has not thought about p to an extent
sufficient to make his not having any intuitions significant. From the point of view of such an
observer, the facts are simply these (taking for simplicity the case of disagreement between two
peers): (1) person A has an intuition that p is true; (2) person B has an intuition that p is false; (3)
there is no reason to think that either A or B is more likely to be correct in his intuition. Surely
the only proper attitude for such an observer is to withhold judgment on p. But even if I am A or
B, should I not judge the situation in the same way as a neutral observer should? Surely it is
wrong to prefer my opinion simply because it is mine.27
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Let’s call this form of evidentialism, ‘social evidentialism.’ It is important to see that social evidentialism
is stronger than evidentialism simplicter. For one might be in the situation of governing one’s beliefs
appropriately vis-a-vis the available evidence, and still be in a situation characterized by a lack of
consensus regarding that belief among your epistemic peers. An evidentialist will deem such a belief to
still be rational; a social evidentialist will not.
It is important to see that social evidentialism builds on the assumption of evidentialism
simplicter. That is, the notion that one’s beliefs depend on the acceptance of those beliefs by one’s
epistemic peers is only plausible given the assumption that beliefs require an evidential basis. The
implication of this fact is that if evidentialism simplicter is false, then social evidentialism is also false.
Perhaps this is the reason that Plantinga has concentrated on responding to evidentialism simplicter.
The implications of these forms of evidentialism for belief in God can be expressed in the
following argument:
(1) For any person S, it is irrational to accept a belief p if either of the following are true:
(a) S has insufficient evidence for p (evidentialism simplicter)
(b) S’s epistemic peer rejects p (social evidentialism)
(2) One or both of the following seems to be true for S:
(a) There is insufficient evidence for the proposition ‘God exists’
(b) S has epistemic peers who reject the proposition ‘God exists’
(3) Therefore it is irrational for S to believe that God exists.
Evidentialism, in its austere (a) and social (b) varieties, is expressed by (1), and the conjunction of (1),
(2), and (3) expresses what I will call ‘the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God’ or ‘the Evidentialist
Objection’ for short. Further, in the interest of avoiding untoward prolixity, I will use the term
‘evidentialism’ for what I have been calling ‘evidentialism simplicter.’
But why accept this evidentialist dogma? Of course, perhaps even Plantinga would admit that
there is a certain air of plausibility to evidentialism — the idea that ‘one should conform one’s belief to
the available evidence’ does seem reasonable. But, other than its intuitive plausibility, what reasons do
we have for accepting the truth of evidentialism and its attendant consequences for belief in God?
Plantinga suggests that the rationale for evidentialism is rooted in a particular approach to epistemology
with a long history in the Western world, a meta-epistemological dogma called ‘classical
foundationalism.’ Before looking at classical foundationalism, however, we must first briefly discuss the
characteristics of foundationalism in general.

Foundationalism and Properly Basic Beliefs

Classical foundationalists, like foundationalists of any species or dialect, hold that beliefs can be
justified in one of two ways: they are either justified due to their dependence on other well justified
beliefs or they are among a class of beliefs that are accepted immediately, without reference to or
dependence on other beliefs. The former are called inferential, derived, or nonbasic beliefs and the latter
are called non-inferential, immediate, or basic beliefs.
Basic beliefs have two characteristics; both involve the notion of the immediacy or directness of
presentation. First of all, basic beliefs are psychologically direct, they are not inferred or accepted on the
evidential basis of other beliefs. For instance, my belief that ‘I am tired’ is psychologically direct in that
it is not derived from other beliefs in my noetic structure. On the other hand, a derived belief will
necessarily be inferred from at least one other belief, at least one of which will be properly basic. For
example, the derived belief that ‘I need to take a nap’ is inferred from the basic belief that ‘I feel tired’
which is itself basic.
Secondly, basic beliefs are epistemically noninferential. They receive their justification not from
another belief but from something (such as a visual experience) that, though not itself admitting of
justification, can render a belief justified.28 In other words, such a belief might be rationally held by a
person even if that person ceased to hold it on the basis of any other belief. This is to say that:
One could be experientially so situated that, although one's belief that there is water in a glass
before one does rest on reasons (for example, one's belief that one's hostess is serving only
water), it could remain rational even if one ceased to have any reasons for holding it and held it
simply because of one's experience of drinking from the glass.29
In this way, beliefs may oscillate back and forth between proper basicality and nonbasicality depending
on how a person is situated in their environment and perceives their environment at the time.
Take, for instance, my belief ‘my daughter is singing “Jesus Loves Me”.’ This belief is
epistemically direct in that it does not glean its justification from another belief. It arises immediately and
properly from my experience of hearing my daughter sing that well known song, and my experience is
sufficient to provide rational grounds for my belief. An example of an epistemically derived belief would
be: ‘My daughter will sing “Jesus Loves the Little Children” next,’ which is epistemically based on the
inductively well-grounded belief: ‘She always sings “Jesus Loves the Little Children” after “Jesus Loves
Me.”’
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A belief that is both psychologically direct (and hence, basic) and epistemically direct (and hence,
rational) is called a properly basic belief. While a properly basic belief is not accepted on the evidential
basis of other propositions, it is not groundless.30 There is a subtle but very important difference between
‘evidence’ and ‘grounds.’ If I see a person displaying typical pain behavior, I form the belief that ‘she is
in pain.’ I don’t reason from their behavior to the belief or use their behavior as evidence for the belief.
Rather, the experience is the occasion for the belief, and my belief is grounded by the experience.
Consequently, the grounds for accepting properly basic beliefs consist in the circumstances in which the
belief is formed, circumstances which include the relevant ‘experience.’ Given the proper experiential
conditions, beliefs such as There are trees and The world has existed for more than 5 minutes are
grounded by the propositions I see a tree and I had breakfast an hour ago.31 The experience of seeing a
tree is the ground of the belief ‘I see a tree.’ Upon being (to use Roderick Chisholm’s language32)
‘appeared to treely’ the belief ‘I see a tree’ immediately and properly follows.
Further, suppose one tried to formulate an argument for the existence of the tree in question.
Would this argument do anything to increase the rationality of your belief that you see a tree? Clearly
not. According to Plantinga, such a requirement would be just as unnecessary and problematic as
‘believing in the existence of one’s spouse on the basis of the analogical argument for other minds’ — a
state of affairs that would be ‘whimsical at best and unlikely to delight the person concerned.’33
Consequently, proper basicality is a normative or evaluative notion34 which depends on the
experiential conditions in which belief p is formed. This contention, more succinctly framed, is:
(PB)

In circumstances C, subject S may take belief p about object O as properly basic where C
will vary with p.35

In the proper set of circumstances, S will ‘be appeared to’ in a way characteristic of O and thereby form
belief p. Take, for instance, my belief that a red book lies on the table in front of me. The conditions in
which I may take this as properly basic include my being appeared to in a characteristic or ‘red bookly’
30
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way. The same belief is not properly basic in certain conditions, say if I am looking through red-tinted
glasses. Under normal conditions, however, my seeing the red book is sufficient to ground my belief.
Finally, since proper basicality depends on the circumstances in which the belief is formed, the
notion of proper basicality is person-relative.36 A belief will be properly basic for a person if and only if
that person's noetic structure is free of defeaters (a defeater for belief p might be either a belief which
constitutes the denial of p or a second-order belief about the reliability of the means by which or the
circumstances in which p was formed37). Further, it is the nature of that person's experience which
confers rationality on p, and by extension forms the ground of p.38 Consequently, a belief that is properly
basic for one person may not be properly basic or even basic for another person. For example, the
proposition: On June 6, 1944, a large amphibious force landed on the European continent is not properly
basic for me, but it could have been so for an unlucky denizen of Northern France taking a swim in the
English channel near Normandy on that day.

Classical Foundationalism
The forgoing discussion of properly basic beliefs is one that all (or most) foundationalists could
agree with. What divides one species of foundationalism from another is their respective criteria for
proper basicality. What kind of beliefs are appropriately deemed to be properly basic? Plantinga
identifies a theory that has been largely accepted as epistemological dogma for hundreds of years. He
calls this theory classical foundationalism because it represents the conjunction of ancient and medieval
foundationalism and modern foundationalism. Ancient and medieval foundationalism, best represented in
the work of Thomas Aquinas, restricts properly basic beliefs to those that are self-evident and those that
are evident to the senses. Modern foundationalism, whose reigning champions are Rene Descartes and
John Locke, because of their anxiety over the veridicality of perceptual beliefs (those ‘evident to the
senses’), restricted proper basicality to beliefs which are self-evident and incorrigible.
Rather than adjudicate the debates between these strains of foundationalism, Plantinga allows the
term ‘classical foundationalism’ to stand for the conjunction of the two. The classical foundationalist,
therefore, places the following constraints on properly basic beliefs:
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(CF)

A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and only if p is either self-evident to S
or incorrigible for S or evident to the senses for S.39

Self evident beliefs are, among others, propositions of simple arithmetic, simple logical truths or
generalizations from them, and propositions expressing identity and diversity. Examples include: 2 + 1 =
3, ‘No man is both married and unmarried’, or ‘for any proposition p the conjunction of p with its denial
is false.’40 Incorrigible beliefs are those beliefs about one's subjective states of consciousness about
which one cannot be mistaken. Examples of such beliefs are ‘I am dizzy,’ ‘My knee hurts,’ or ‘I see
something green.’41 Finally, beliefs which are evident to the senses are those that arise immediately from
perceptual experience, e.g: ‘It is snowing outside,’ ‘Someone is playing music in the next room,’ or (an
experience parents can relate to) ‘somebody needs a diaper change.’
With regard to these examples the person-relativity and circumstance-relativity of the notion of
proper basicality is again apparent. The belief that it is snowing outside will not be properly basic for
person’s in certain circumstances — say, for a person living in Bora Bora — but it could be so for the
denizen of Minneapolis in January. Similaly, a person who has never spent time with young children may
not immediately form the belief that a diaper change is in order upon experiencing a certain odor in the
presence of young children.
According to Plantinga, the problems with CF are deep and troubling. First of all, the criteria for
proper basicality expressed by CF are so stringent as to disallow many beliefs that are obviously both
rational and basic. In fact, very little of what we take ourselves to know would fit the criterion for proper
basicality specified by CF. The existence of minds other than our own, the past and future, the distant in
space, generalizations of all sorts, hypotheticals, the unobservable fine structure of objects, personal
identity, human freedom, all fall outside this area.42 As such, the noetic structure of one committed to CF
would have very few foundational or basic beliefs, and, would be symbolically represented by an inverted
pyramid (as befits its Cartesian roots) rather than the upright pyramid that usually represents a
foundationalist noetic structure.
Plantinga has also demonstrated a more devastating problem with CF. For the classical
foundationalist to accept CF, it must follow from or be probable with respect to what is self-evident,
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incorrigible, or evident to the senses. But there exists no argument for CF which follows from premises
which meet the classical foundationalist’s own criterion. In fact, it’s difficult to see how such an
argument could even get off the ground. Therefore, CF must be taken as a basic belief. However, if only
propositions which are self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses can be properly basic, how is
one to view the following proposition: A statement is properly basic for me only if it is self-evident,
incorrigible, or evident to the senses? This proposition is clearly neither self-evident, incorrigible, nor
evident to the senses and therefore it cannot be justified by its own criterion. Consequently, Plantinga
finds the classical foundationalist’s criterion for proper basicality self-referentially inconsistent.
It is important to see that Plantinga’s argument against classical foundationalism is not an
argument against foundationalism in general. There are many different versions of foundationalism, and
Plantinga’s own epistemology is a version of foundationalism (it has been called ‘moderate
foundationalism’ or ‘broad foundationalism.’) In fact, his claim that belief in God can be properly basic
entails a foundationalist epistemology — the notion of a basic belief is incoherent in the context of a
nonfoundationalist epistemology which rejects the very distinction between a basic and nonbasic belief.
What Plantinga rejects is the classical foundationalist’s narrow criteria for proper basicality. Of course, he
too accepts that propositions that are self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses are properly basic;
what he rejects as self-referentially incoherent is the claim that ‘a proposition is properly basic only if it
meets this condition,’ (viz., CF).43
According to Plantinga, the failure of classical foundationalism casts serious doubt on
evidentialism: ‘It is evident . . . that classical foundationalism is bankrupt, and insofar as the evidentialist
objection is rooted on classical foundationalism, it is poorly rooted indeed.’44 However, Plantinga does
not offer an argument linking classical foundationalism and evidentialism. He seems to rely on the
intuitive connection between the two and the historical fact that many have taken the former as rationale
for the latter. Consequently, with the demise of classical foundationalism, he suggests that ‘the next
move is up to the evidentialist objector. He must specify a criterion for proper basicality that is free from
self-referential difficulties, rules out belief in God as properly basic, and is such that there is some reason
to think it is true.’45 Plantinga clearly thinks that such a task is not possible.
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For Plantinga, the failure of the evidentialist objection validates a central tenet of Reformed
epistemology: the claim that belief in God can be properly basic; it does not need argument or
propositional evidence to be rational. Plantinga does not, however, attempt to give positive arguments in
support of this contention. What he does is (1) attack the evidentialist objection, (2) explain the how
belief about God is understood in the Reformed theological heritage, and (3) answer some possible
objections.46 Plantinga’s explanation of the phenomenology of properly basic belief in God cannot be
sensibly thought of as an argument for the proper basicality of belief in God and certainly not an
argument designed to convince the skeptic, primarily because Plantinga invokes, but does not really argue
for, the theology of the Reformed tradition.
Although Plantinga does not make this connection explicit, his approach to the issue of the
proper basicality of belief in God is heavily influenced by his understanding of the nature of Christian
scholarship. Recall what I have termed Plantinga’s ‘Christian Scholarship Thesis’:
(CST) The Christian scholar does not have to accept only those things deemed acceptable by the
broader Christian community. Rather, she may accept core Christian beliefs and reason
from those beliefs in her academic work.
The fact that he eschews the task of showing that belief in God is properly basic and contents himself with
explaining the Reformed theological perspective on the matter makes perfect sense given his belief that
Christian scholarship need not attempt to meet the standards defined by the broader academic community.
The contention that belief in God can be properly basic is also closely connected with what
Plantinga calls ‘the Reformed objection to natural theology.’ The objection to natural theology on the
part of Reformed theologians is not an objection to argumentation per se. Rather, Plantinga sees in the
work of Calvin, Bavinck, and Kuyper (as well as other Reformed thinkers) an inchoate rejection of the
evidentialist objection — ‘inchoate’ because they did not formulate their rejection in those terms.47 The
influence of Bavinck on Plantinga’s religious epistemology, particularly his argument in God and Other
Minds is evident in this quote:
There is not a single object the existence of which we hesitate to accept until some definite proofs
are furnished. Of the existence of self, of the world round about us, of logical and moral laws,
etc., we are so deeply convinced because of the indelible impressions which all these things make
upon our consciousness that we need no arguments or demonstration. Spontaneously, altogether
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involuntarily: without any constraint or coercion, we accept that existence. Now the same is true
in regard to the existence of God. The so-called proofs . . . are by no means the final grounds of
our most certain conviction that God exists.48
Therefore, following his Reformed predecessors, Plantinga’s claim is that belief in God need not accrue
epistemic merit, rationality or justification, only from an argument. In fact, one who believes that his
belief is only rational given an argument is ‘in an epistemically substandard position.’49 Rather, belief in
God can be properly basic.
Recall that in the case of properly basic beliefs there will be an occasion or set of circumstances
which provide the justificatory grounds for the belief, and in so doing ground the belief itself.50 Similarly,
according to Plantinga, there are circumstances which ground or occasion beliefs about God. He draws
heavily on the thought of John Calvin who spoke of these sorts of circumstances as a disposition or
tendency to see God’s hand in creation. Beliefs such as ‘God is speaking to me,’ ‘God created all of this,’
‘God disapproves of what I have done,’ and ‘God forgives me’ are all properly basic in the right
circumstances. And these beliefs ‘self-evidently entail that God exists.’51
This discussion of the circumstances which occasion properly basic beliefs about God raises an
important question: What circumstances are such that they ground basic beliefs about God? This question
raises the issue of the criteria for properly basic belief and Plantinga’s response is an important
characteristic of his broad foundationalism. Instead of prescribing criteria for proper basicality ahead of
time, Plantinga argues that such criteria should be arrived at inductively.
We must assemble examples of beliefs and conditions such that the former are obviously properly
basic in the latter, and examples of beliefs and conditions such that the former are obviously
not properly basic in the latter. We must then frame hypotheses as to the necessary and sufficient
conditions of proper basicality and test these hypotheses by reference to those examples.52
Therefore,
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criteria for proper basicality must be reached from below rather than from above. They should
not be presented ex cathedra but argued to and tested by a relevant set of examples.53
Plantinga’s reasoning seems to be this: It is impossible to formulate criteria for proper basicality if we do
not first have the ability to recognize particular cases of properly basic belief.54 The criteria are
established by the obvious examples; the examples are not made obvious by the criteria.
But who decides what counts as an obvious example of properly basic belief? Undoubtedly a
resolute atheist and a committed believer will disagree on whether the belief ‘God created the starry
hosts’ is properly grounded by the circumstance of observing the night sky. Plantinga’s response to this
line of questioning is both thought-provoking and highly controversial.
There is no reason to assume, in advance, that everyone will agree on the example. The Christian
of course will suppose that belief in God is entirely proper and rational; if he does not accept this
belief on the basis of other propositions, he will conclude that it is basic for him and quite
properly so. Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn Murray O’Hare may disagree; but how
is that relevant? Must my criteria or those of the Christian community conform to their
examples? Surely not. The Christian community is responsible to its set of examples, not to
theirs.55
Plantinga goes on to point out that
criteria for proper basicality arrived at in this particularistic way may not be polemically useful. . .
. [I] cannot sensibly use my criterion to try to convince you that [belief] B is properly basic in
[circumstances] C . . . [and] by the same token you cannot sensibly use your criterion to try to
convince me that B is not, in fact, properly basic in C.56
Criteria for properly basic belief, therefore, are community-relative. Again, this connection makes perfect
sense in light of his understanding of the nature of scholarship — there is, according to Plantinga, no
religiously neutral perspective on whether belief in God can be properly basic. Undoubtedly, Plantinga’s
affirmation of the proper basicality of belief in God is a function of his theological commitments, but the
atheist’s rejection of the proper basicality of belief in God is also religiously implicated.
Some have suggested that Plantinga’s stance on criteria for properly basic beliefs entails a version
of religious relativism. Michael Martin, for example, says ‘Plantinga’s foundationalism is radically
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relativistic and puts any belief beyond rational appraisal once it is declared basic.’57 But Martin is clearly
mistaken. There is nothing about a properly basic belief that makes it immune to contrary argument or
defeat. It could be that a person accepts belief in God as basic, but also accepts (or comes to accept) other
propositions which entail that God does not exist. Plantinga’s understanding of properly basic beliefs in
no way suggests that when the person in question becomes aware of this epistemologically inauspicious
state, they are within their rights in ignoring the arguments, evidence, or beliefs which contradict their
belief in God. In such a case, some change in his or her noetic structure is called for. If the person
believes the atheistic propositions (propositions which suggest the nonexistence of God) more strongly
than they believe that God exists, then, according to Plantinga, they ‘will have to give the latter up.’58
Plantinga’s argument is merely that accepting an argument which entails ‘atheistic propositions’
does not necessitate that one to give up belief in God. ‘All your argument really shows is that there is
trouble somewhere in my noetic structure. A change must be made somewhere, but the argument does
not show where.’59 There are any number of avenues open to the theist. Plantinga lists a few: ‘Perhaps I
will give up one of the premises instead, or perhaps I will give up their conjunction. Perhaps I will give
up one of the argument forms involved in the inference of the denial of [belief in God] from those
premises.’60 Another prominent avenue open to the theist is to give up certain theological propositions
which give rise to the atheistic argument in question. For example, in response to certain versions of the
problem of evil which argue that God’s goodness is incompatible with His meticulous determination of
every aspect of the world, one might modify one’s understanding of divine providence such that God is
generally in control, but does not determine every event.
Therefore, Martin’s claim that Plantinga’s religious epistemology is relativistic runs afoul of the
fact that the justification conferring conditions associated with properly basic belief in God ‘must be seen
as conferring prima facie rather than ultima facie, or all things considered, justification.’61
Plantinga anticipates yet another objection to his understanding of the criteria for properly basic
beliefs:
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Why cannot just any belief be properly basic? Could we not say the same for any bizarre
aberration we can think of? What about voodoo or astrology? What about the belief that the
Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween? Could I properly take that as basic? . . . If we say that
belief in God is properly basic, will we not be committed to holding that just anything, or nearly
anything, can properly be taken as basic, thus throwing wide the gates to irrationalism and
superstition?62
If one accepts that belief in God is properly basic, must one also accept that belief in the Great Pumpkin is
properly basic? Certainly not. Plantinga’s claims about properly basic belief crucially involve an
appropriate relation between certain experiences and the beliefs they invoke. The mere fact that ‘a certain
belief kind produces properly basic beliefs when based on a certain kind of experience [does not warrant
the claim] that any other belief kind could rate that privilege, or that any other kind of experience could
confer it.’63 What Plantinga must grant is that other religious traditions — even believers in the Great
Pumpkin — might utilize a similar methodology to claim that their beliefs are properly basic. In other
words, from their point of view, and given the criteria for proper basicality deemed reasonable by their
community, they will deem their religious beliefs to be properly basic. After all, it is not possible to do
away with evidentialism with regard to belief in the Christian God and keep it with regard to the Great
Pumpkin. But this in no way requires that Plantinga himself accept the rationality of belief in the Great
Pumpkin. Neither does it suggest that belief in the Great Pumpkin is rational.
Plantinga’s argument does not, therefore, throw open the door of rationality to any set of beliefs
or to any religious tradition. It merely closes the door on any attempt to determine universal and binding
criteria for properly basic religious beliefs.
An Evaluation of Plantinga’s Early ‘Reformed Epistemology’
Plantinga’s ‘Reformed Epistemology’ spawned a veritable blizzard of responses and objections,
both from theologians and philosophers. In the years following ‘Reason and Belief in God,’ Plantinga
continued to refine his thinking on a number of crucial aspects of his proposal, in some cases revising his
original proposal, but more often expanding or fleshing it out. Many of these refinements were either
directly or indirectly influenced by objections to his theory.

62

RBG, 74.

63

James Sennett, Modality, Probability, and Rationality, 115.

While it is outside the scope of this project to discuss all different species of objections to
Plantinga’s ‘Reformed Epistemology’ at this stage of its development, I will consider objections which
affect the development of his mature religious epistemology. Again, my purpose in this chapter is not to
critique, but to clarify Plantinga’s proposal at this stage.
Three matters stand out as particularly important. The first is Plantinga’s method of arguing
against evidentialism in general and the Evidentialist Objection to belief in God in particular, the second
is Plantinga’s discussion of the relationship between ‘defeaters’ and properly basic belief in God, and the
third is Plantinga’s construal of the task of Reformed epistemology. The implications of this latter issue
are particularly significant for they highlight the direction his religious epistemology will take in Stage
III.

Evidentialism and Classical Foundationalism
One of the most influential aspects of Plantinga’s work during what I have labeled as Stage II is
his critique of evidentialism and classical foundationalism. Plantinga’s argument against evidentialism
can be summarized as follows:
(1) Evidentialism is rooted in classical foundationalism.
(2) Classical foundationalism is self-referentially inconsistent and therefore invalid.
(3) Therefore, evidentialism is invalid.
Some, to refute this syllogism, have denied the second premise, that classical foundationalism is selfreferentially inconsistent. Philip Quinn, for example, has argued that it may be possible to derive the
classical foundationalist’s criterion for proper basicality from propositions which are, by its own light,
properly basic and, in so doing, avoid the charge of self-referential inconsistency.64 While Quinn’s
approach is not flatly or obviously impossible, he clearly faces an up-hill struggle. Even William Hasker,
someone sympathetic with some of Quinn’s epistemological convictions, has argued that it unlikely that
this line of argument can succeed.65 But it is true that Plantinga has not shown that classical
foundationalism is self-referentially incoherent. To use a medical analogy, classical foundationalism is in
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serious, perhaps critical condition, but the call for a coroner is probably premature. William Alston
expresses this point clearly:
[Plantinga] suggests that it is ‘hard to see’ that [CF] follows from propositions which are [selfevident or incorrigible]. That isn’t good enough to support the substantive claim that the modern
foundationalist cannot be justified in accepting [CF]. Let me hasten to say that I share
Plantinga’s impressions on this point. I too am unable to see how [CF] can receive the kind of
justification that is allowed by the modern foundationalist. But I am far from supposing that this
puts me in a position to assert that the modern foundationalist has, or can have, no adequate
ground for [CF]. This is going much too fast; the matter requires more thorough exploration.66
It is interesting to note, however, that in the years since RBG, relatively few have joined in the effort to
resuscitate classical foundationalism.67 So, even if classical foundationalism is not dead, the paucity of
responses to Plantinga’s challenge seems to support Plantinga’s (and Alston’s) suspicions that classical
foundationalism is terminally ill.68
Regardless of the status of Plantinga’s second premise, a more plausible line of attack is to call
into question Plantinga’s first premise. While it does seem obvious that evidentialism may be based on
CF, and therefore subject to CF's problem of self-referential inconsistency, it is far less obvious that
evidentialism must be rooted in CF. William Alston expresses the matter like this:
Even if we hold the evidentialist to be propounding some general conditions for basicality, why
must they be those embodied in classical foundationalism? It is true that classical
foundationalism is widely held and that it serves the purpose. . . . However it is by no means the
only position that will serve.69
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Fellow Reformed Epistemologist, Nicholas Wolterstorff, makes a similar point. He says: ‘[Plantinga’s]
discussion puts us in the position of seeing that the most common and powerful argument for
evidentialism is classical foundationalism, and of seeing that classical foundationalism is unacceptable.
But to deprive the evidentialist of his best defense is not yet to show that his contention is false.’ 70
A number of suggestions have been made as to how else evidentialism might be rooted. These
are: basing evidentialism in a modified form of foundationalism71 or in a coherentist epistemological
framework.72 If either of these suggestions have any validity, then it is possible that evidentialism is true
even if classical foundationalism is false. In other words, there is no decisive argument linking the two
and some plausible suggestions which support the claim that the two are independent. Plantinga himself
has admitted (in responses to William Alston) that there is no argument that he can think of that logically
connects the two. However, he finds the connection between the two ‘plausible.’73
Norman Kretzmann has pushed the argument for the independence of classical foundationalism
and evidentialism even farther. He says:
Classical foundationalism’s technical details, which Plantinga relies on in his attempted refutation
of it, do not extend down to the evidentialist roots. So whatever Plantinga might think he could
do to evidentialism as a result of tying it to [classical] foundationalism can have no effect on the
evidentialist objection itself.74
In fact, Kretzmann suggests that it is much more reasonable to see the relationship between classical
foundationalism and evidentialism as being quite the other way around: ‘We can get a better
understanding of the classical foundationalist if we see him as attempting to elaborate and codify the
intuition expressible as evidentialism. Evidentialism is not rooted in classical foundationalism, classical
foundationalism is rooted in evidentialism.’75
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James Sennett proposes that evidentialism might fit perfectly well in a ‘modified
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Evaluating the arguments for and against premise (1) and premise (2) is a complex matter — one
clearly beyond the scope of this work. More significant for my purposes is the fact that in Plantinga’s
subsequent arguments against evidentialism, he has ceased to rely on the connection with classical
foundationalism as an argument against evidentialism. He still clearly thinks that both evidentialism and
classical foundationalism are false and he still sees some kind of connection between the two, but he
seems less convinced that evidentialism is false because classical foundationalism is false.
But what then is the problem with evidentialism? Answering this question incited Plantinga to
look more deeply into the epistemological issues surrounding his proposal, particularly the idea that there
are epistemic duties and the fulfillment of these epistemic duties is central to the epistemological
enterprise. During Stage II, Plantinga accepted a deontological conception of rationality and justification
— that is, a conception of rationality and justification that involved crucially the fulfillment of one’s
epistemic duties. On this notion, a person is rational or justified with respect to a particular belief to the
degree that their epistemic duties were fulfilled with respect to that belief. Plantinga accepted the
centrality of deontology, but rejected the evidentialist’s proclamation that the relevant duty was to
proportion one’s beliefs to the available evidence. During Stage III, Plantinga began to explore the deep
and labyrinthian connections between deontological formulations of the epistemological task and
evidentialism. In so doing, Plantinga turned his critical eye on the related notions of Classical
Deontologism (the notion that duties and obligations play a central role in the entire epistemic enterprise)
and Internalism (the idea that what makes a belief justified are features that are accessible to the believer).
Both of these ideas are extremely important and will be discussed in Chapter Three and in greater detail in
Chapter Four.

Defeaters and Properly Basic Belief in God
During the years between ‘Reason and Belief in God’ and Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga
was forced to address the topic of ‘defeaters’ and their implications for properly basic belief in God.
While Plantinga had always acknowledged that properly basic belief was not indefeasible, a series of
articles by Philip Quinn gave him the opportunity to consider the topic in greater depth.76 The topic of
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defeaters is important for two reasons. First, it clarifies Plantinga’s claims during Stage II. Second, and
even more importantly, the notion of a defeater plays a central role in Plantinga’s mature religious
epistemology, and so, it is helpful to understand Plantinga’s early ruminations on this matter.
Philip Quinn is prepared to grant Plantinga’s claim that there are conditions that prima
facie justify believers in forming basic beliefs about God. Nevertheless, he believes that there are ample
defeaters for theistic belief: the problem of evil, theories which suggest that belief in God is illusory or
merely projective, etc. Quinn argues that those aware of defeaters for theistic belief — for instance,
intellectually sophisticated, educated, adult members of contemporary pluralistic society — cannot
rationally continue to hold their beliefs about God in the basic way. Epistemic duty requires that they
augment their belief with evidence or argument, in which case their belief in God is no longer basic. He
summarizes his argument as follows:
I conclude that many, perhaps most, intellectually sophisticated adult theists in our culture are
seldom if ever in conditions which are right for propositions like those expressed by [‘God is
speaking to me,’ ‘God disapproves of what I have done,’ ‘God forgives me for what I have done’]
to be properly basic for them.’77
Two points deserve noting. First, it is important to note the care with which both Quinn and
Plantinga make their points. Neither are prepared to make universal claims. Quinn intends his argument
to apply only to ‘many, perhaps most’ theists, and Plantinga grants that it is possible that properly basic
belief in God can be defeated.78 Secondly, Quinn is not claiming that there are arguments, such as the
problem of evil and Freud’s projection theories which actually do disconfirm theism, but that these
arguments are typically taken as by intellectually sophisticated adult theists as evidence against theism.79
His claim is that such theists would become aware of the epistemic predicament presented for their
theistic beliefs by these arguments upon sufficient reflection, and that failing to reflect sufficiently upon
these arguments would be epistemically blameworthy, it would involve the failure to perform a required
epistemic duty.
Plantinga’s responses to Quinn’s objections represent his first foray into an arena — the matter of
the nature and implications of ‘defeaters’ — which plays an important role in his mature religious
epistemology. Plantinga argues that the presence of defeaters for belief in God need not require that the
between Plantinga and Quinn in ‘The Foundations of Theism: Scoring the Quinn-Plantinga Debate.’
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believer support his or her beliefs evidentially, thereby eliminating their properly basic status. Instead,
the believer can defeat the defeater; show how the defeater fails in some respect or is not relevant to the
matter of God’s existence. An example of such a ‘defeater-defeater’ is Plantinga’s Free Will Defense
which is a widely publicized defeater for one of the versions of the problem of evil, the ‘deductive’
problem of evil. Plantinga claims that such defeater-defeaters protect the properly basic status of theistic
beliefs because the theistic belief is not based (epistemically) on the defeater-defeater. Rather, the belief
continues to be grounded by the experience which occasioned the belief. Plantinga calls this kind of
defeater-defeater an extrinsic defeater-defeater.
Of course, there are a bewildering variety of defeaters for theistic belief and the arguments for
and against these atheological arguments are extremely complex. Even if Plantinga’s free will defense
constitutes an answer to the deductive problem of evil, the problem of evil in its evidential and existential
variants remains a vexed issue for theistic belief. Similarly, projective theories of belief in God, like
those offered by Feuerbach, Freud, and Marx, are deemed by many to explain, and hence explain away,
belief in God.
While I believe that there are definitely responses to these anti-theistic arguments, responses
which are valid and illuminative, it would be unreasonable to see all of these responses as decisive
refutations. Suppose a believer becomes aware of the fact that there are no definitive refutations for many
anti-theistic arguments — in other words, suppose that the believer realizes that there exists no decisive
extrinsic defeater-defeater for these arguments. Is this person — Quinn’s ‘intellectually sophisticated
adult believer’ — forced to evidentially support her belief? In the face of these arguments, and in the
absence of an extrinsic defeater-defeater, must she provide some positive propositional grounding for her
belief in the existence of God? Plantinga does not think so. His argument calls into question the implicit
requirement that a defeater-defeater must be independent of the grounds for the original belief. In
addition to extrinsic defeater-defeaters, Plantinga claims that there are intrinsic defeater-defeaters. In the
case of an intrinsic defeater-defeater, an anti-theistic argument is defeated by the warrant or grounds
accompanying the theistic belief itself. Plantinga explains the notions of extrinsic and intrinsic defeaterdefeaters as follows: ‘When a basic belief p has more by way of warrant than a potential defeater q of p,
then p is an intrinsic defeater of q — an intrinsic defeater-defeater, we might say. A belief r is an
extrinsic defeater-defeater if it defeats a defeater q of a belief p distinct from r.’80
Plantinga explains the relevance of intrinsic defeater-defeaters with his now relatively famous
example, titled variously ‘the purloined letter example’ or the ‘letter filching example.’
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I am applying to the National Endowment for the Humanities for a fellowship; I write a letter to a
colleague, trying to bribe him to write the Endowment a glowing letter on my behalf; he
indignantly refuses and sends the letter to my chairman. The letter disappears from the
chairman’s office under mysterious circumstances. I have motive for stealing it; I have the
opportunity to do so; and I have been known to do such things in the past. Furthermore an
extremely reliable member of the department claims to have seen me furtively entering the
chairman’s office at about the time when the letter must have been stolen. The evidence against
me is very strong; my colleagues reproach me for such underhanded behavior and treat me with
evident distaste. The facts of the matter, however, are that I didn’t steal the letter and in fact
spent the entire afternoon in question on a solitary walk in the woods; furthermore I clearly
remember spending that afternoon walking in the woods.81
In such a case, Plantinga claims that it is entirely reasonable, even in the face of overwhelming evidence
for which there are no extrinsic defeater-defeaters, to continue to believe the following:
(B) I was alone in the woods all that afternoon, and did not steal the letter.
Further, this belief will be properly basic.82 The point of Plantinga’s example is clear. Despite the
strength of the arguments against belief in God, the degree of nonpropositional warrant the believer has
for their belief ‘God exists’ is sufficient to deflect defeaters for their belief. In other words, just as the
professor’s memory of being in the woods on that afternoon defeats potential defeaters for (B), the
grounds of the Christian’s belief in God serves as an intrinsic defeater-defeater for atheological objections
to their belief.
It is important to remember that the question of defeaters for properly basic belief in God is
analogous to the hapless professor’s belief in (B), not the belief of the professor’s colleagues about his
guilt. Undoubtedly, upon surveying the evidence against the professor, most rational people would
conclude that he was guilty. That is obvious, but not relevant. What is relevant is the professor’s belief
in (B), or in the case of belief in God, the believer’s grounds for their theistic beliefs.
It is also important to see that Plantinga’s example is an implicit statement of one of the
hallmarks of his religious epistemology, the parity thesis. The assumption behind the ‘purloined letter’
example is that beliefs about God can be on the same epistemic footing as clear memory beliefs. But this
is exactly what many people are unwilling to grant Plantinga. James Sennett argues:
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The purloined letter case has such intuitive force precisely because memory belief is universally
accepted as properly basic. All of us understand the phenomenon of vivid memory belief with
substantial external evidence against it. We understand what it is to reject such evidence in favor
of the memorial force, and feel justified in doing so. But the claim that basic theistic belief might
be so vindicated loses such phenomenological force for many. . . . The purloined letter case has
such intuitive force, in part, because memory beliefs are universally sanctioned, while theistic
beliefs are not.83
The point of contention here is this: Sennett, and others who are suspicious of Plantinga’s
religious epistemology in general and parity thesis in particular, deem the warrant of properly basic
beliefs about God to be significantly less than the warrant for memorial beliefs. Plantinga, on the other
hand, obviously deems the warrant for theistic beliefs to be considerable.84 The lesson here is that the
question of defeaters for properly basic belief in God rests on the matter of the degree of warrant
possessed by believers for their beliefs. For Plantinga’s arguments to succeed, therefore, he must claim
that the warrant for such beliefs is extensive. This is, however, a matter he does not address at this stage
of the development of his religious epistemology.

The Task of Reformed Epistemology

Understanding the task of Reformed epistemology at its most basic level is simple enough.
Plantinga desires to defend the intellectual credibility of belief in God. Articulating this basic task in
detail, however, is much more complicated. During Stage II Plantinga applied a Reformed theological
stance to questions about belief in God with the purpose of defending:
(RE)

Theistic belief need not be based on propositional evidence in order to have positive
epistemic status.

As James Sennett notes, however, RE is a fairly general claim. It is ambiguous between two different
interpretations. He calls these two interpretations ‘Weak Reformed Epistemology’ (WRE) and ‘Strong
Reformed Epistemology’ (SRE):
(WRE) It is epistemically possible, in the informed sense, that basic theistic belief be justified.
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A fact noted by William Hasker, ‘The Foundations of Theism: Scoring the Quinn-Plantinga
Debate,’ 61.
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(SRE) Most theists in contemporary Western culture are justified in accepting some theistic
beliefs basically.85
It is clear that Plantinga accepts both WRE and SRE as true, and it is equally clear that he is arguing that
WRE is true, for WRE is a very minimal claim. But is he arguing that SRE is true? This is less obvious.
In the final sentence of a reply to Philip Quinn he says: ‘I am therefore inclined to believe that belief in
God is properly basic for most theists — even intellectually sophisticated adult theists.’86 This is, of
course, an obvious affirmation of SRE. James Sennett takes this affirmation to indicate that SRE
represents the core claim of Reformed Epistemology, an essential part of Plantinga’s argument during
Stage II. I disagree. I believe that there is a gap between what Plantinga believes and what he is prepared
to claim.87 (This ‘gap,’ I believe, is due, partialy but not completely to the fact that Plantinga’s work at
this stage is still ‘in process.’) I find nothing in Plantinga’s early work that can plausibly be taken as
purposed to argue for SRE and I find it very plausible that the above quote is a statement of his belief, not
a summary of his position on religious epistemology. Even a weaker version of SRE seems too strong:
(SRE-) Most theists in contemporary Western culture could be justified in accepting some
theistic beliefs basically.88
I believe that the flaw in SRE and SRE- is found in their application of Plantinga’s statements about
proper basicality to a particular class of people, exemplified in Sennett’s use of the quantifier ‘most.’
Instead, I believe that Plantinga’s claims need to be seen as applying to the category of theistic belief, but
not necessarily to any particular theist. In all of his work, Plantinga seems very reticent to make any
specific claims about the beliefs of particular believers. For example, in many places he acknowledges
that theists might take their belief in God as requiring evidence, and there is no evidence that he views
such a stance as being utterly mistaken or misguided. Such a view, according to Plantinga, is merely
unnecessary.

To put my objection to Sennett’s construal of RE another way, Plantinga’s claims about

properly basic belief seem to have ‘belief in God’ as their object, not ‘particular believers.’ In other
words, he is claiming that belief in God is such that it is rational even in the absence of propositional
evidence. He does not seem to be claiming that this or that believer is rational in his or her belief. Now
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obviously, what he says about theistic belief can be generalized to particular believers, but he does not do
the generalizing, and neither does he provide any direction on what such generalizations should look like.
Frankly, to my mind, this is perfectly reasonable. It is one thing to discuss religious belief generally, but
it is quite another to pretend to speak for particular beliefs. Consequently, I believe that Plantinga’s
purpose is to talk about the nature of theistic belief and, as such, his claims regarding belief in God are
best seen as a stronger version of WRE:
(WRE+)

There is no good reason to think that theistic belief is the sort of belief that cannot be
properly basic.

I think that WRE+ is much closer to what Plantinga is after. However, in the process of a
dialogue with Philip Quinn, Plantinga says something that suggests that WRE+ can even be strengthened
a bit further. Philip Quinn argued that it was not possible for ‘intellectually sophisticated’ adult theists to
accept belief in God as properly basic.89 In the face of arguments against God’s existence such as the
problem of evil, such people must augment their belief with evidence to remain rational in their belief.
Plantinga, of course, disagrees. His denial of Quinn’s argument yields what I believe accurately
expresses Plantinga’s claims during Stage II:
(WRE++) There is no good reason to think that theistic belief is the sort of belief that cannot be
properly basic, even for those who are aware of defeaters for belief in God.
Suppose my evaluation of the central claim of Reformed epistemology is correct. Even so,
important questions remain. For instance, what is the relationship between Plantinga’s rejection of the
evidentialism objection to belief in God and the claim that belief in God can be fully rational, justified,
and properly basic, or that belief in God can constitute knowledge? For that matter, with regard to belief
in God, how should epistemic notions like ‘knowledge,’ ‘rationality’ and ‘justification’ be understood?
The matter of the intellectual credibility of belief in God is not expressed by a single question, but
by a complicated web of interrelated questions. To better understand Plantinga’s project, let’s consider a
couple different varieties of epistemological tasks or projects.90 There is, first of all, the task that is most
readily associated with epistemology, namely answering the following question:
(I)

For any belief p, does p possess positive epistemic status x?
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where x could stand for a range of epistemological virtues: knowledge, rationality, justification, warrant,
etc. The question ‘Is belief in God rational?’ is an example of this sort of question.
Associated with (I) are two sub-projects, and the distinction between these is very important in
Plantinga’s work. There is a positive version of (I):
(IA) What are the reasons for thinking that the answer to (I) is positive?
and a negative version:
(IB) Are the reasons for giving a negative answer to (I) persuasive?
But there is another question lurking in the background that is even more fundamental, namely:
(II)

What is x and what principles govern the application of x to a particular belief?

In simplest terms, the question I have labeled (II) involves the attempt to seek general principles that lay
down the conditions for a given belief to have a specified kind of positive epistemic status, be it
rationality, justification, or warrant, and (I), together with its associated sub-projects, involves the attempt
to determine which beliefs satisfy those conditions.91
When applied to the matter of belief in God, (IA) undoubtedly includes the project of natural
theology, but is not limited to natural theology. It includes theological notions such as Calvin’s sensus
divinitatis, divine revelation, and the like. While Plantinga clearly believes that there is much to be said
about (IA), the task of Reformed epistemology in Stage II is to answer (IB). WRE++ is a negative claim;
it is offered as a response to the evidentialist objection to belief in God. Pace the evidentialist objector,
Plantinga claims that belief in God can be properly basic. But this only raises another deeper question:
What epistemic quality is denoted by the ‘properly’ in properly basic? In GOM Plantinga identified this
epistemic quality as rationality; and in RBG he alternates between referring to it as rationality and
justification. In both works, however, Plantinga seems to construe these epistemic qualities
deontologically — a rational or justified belief is a belief that one can hold without flouting one’s
epistemic duties. But what sorts of things are deontological rationality and justification and, more
importantly, what is the connection between those epistemic constructs and knowledge? At this stage in
the development of his religious epistemology, Plantinga does not answer these questions. The reason for
this is that at this stage Plantinga answers (IB) without first answering (II). Plantinga’s own evaluation of
his early work speaks volumes.
In God and Other Minds . . . I was trying to address [the evidentialist objection to theistic belief]
— trying to address it, because I didn’t then understand it very well. From my present vantage
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point, God and Other Minds looks like a promising attempt by someone a little long on chutzpah
but a little short on epistemology.92
This lacuna in his religious epistemology had important consequences. In the absence of having
articulated a sufficiently fine-grained account of rationality, justification, and warrant, it is difficult for
him to make the connection between his negative claim (WRE++) and the positive claim: that belief in
God can be rational (or justified, or warranted). In other words, he found it difficult to articulate a case
for (IA). Consequently, he focuses on his negative claim, expressed by (IB), that pace the evidentialist
objector, belief in God is permitted. This claim, however, is a very minimal one. As George Mavrodes
points out,
It is a feature of the logic of permission, however, that a permission is not equivalent to a duty
and that a person may have, and often does have, equally good permissions for two or more
incompatible courses of action. . . . If we construe rationality as a sort of epistemic permission,
then the fact that a certain belief is, or would be rational, is not a reason for holding it.93
While Plantinga’s claims in Stage II are minimalistic, they are not inconsequential. The task of
Reformed epistemology can be likened to arguing that one is permitted to doing something that was
previously thought to be illegal, say walking down a particular side of a street. ‘If someone, however,
could show that it was not in fact illegal — we had simply misunderstood the law, perhaps — then the
apparent reason for not walking there would disappear.’94 Plantinga’s efforts are, therefore, apologetic in
the sense that he is defending the intellectual credibility of theistic belief. Theistic belief survives the
evidentialist objection to belief in God unscathed.
Of course, Plantinga does have an answer to (II) at this stage; it is not as though he would have
been stumped by the questions ‘what is rationality?’ or ‘what is knowledge?’ He had, however, not
developed his answer in detail, and most importantly, he hadn’t worked out the relationship between his
answer to II and his primary project, IB. Consequently, understanding Plantinga’s work at this stage
requires a careful distinction between what Plantinga believes and what he is prepared to claim.
At this stage, Plantinga is careful not to equate ‘properly basic belief in God’ with ‘knowledge
that God exists.’ But he does refer to knowledge of God, primarily when he refers to Calvin’s
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understanding of the epistemic status of faith. He points out that Calvin believes that one who believes in
God’s existence on the basis of an implanted disposition to so believe, ‘knows that God exists.’95 And, of
course, Plantinga himself believes that the theist can know that God exists. But he also realizes the
implications of arguing that a particular claim constitutes knowledge — something that many of his
critics seem not to appreciate. For a belief to be knowledge, it must also be true — false knowledge is a
square circle. Consequently, arguing that belief in God does constitute knowledge would require arguing
that it is true, something that Plantinga does not think can be done. The traditional picture of knowledge
as being what you can prove to all (or nearly all normal rational human beings), according to Plantinga,
must be given up.96
That being said, in response to a series of articles by Jay Van Hook,97 Plantinga acknowledged
the importance of articulating an epistemology that could explain the Calvinist intuition that faith was ‘a
firm and certain knowledge.’98 In these articles we catch a glimpse of the shape of his future work on this
topic. He acknowledges that deciphering the structure of knowledge is a hard, but important task. He then
points to the work of John Calvin (‘the fons et origo of all things Reformed and thus of Reformed
epistemology’99). Calvin claimed that God created humans with a disposition to see God’s hand in
nature, and thereby to form beliefs about God.
God has so created us that there is a tendency or disposition to see his hand in the world about us.
More precisely, there is in us a disposition to believe propositions of the sort this flower was
created by God or this vast and intricate universe was created by God when we contemplate the
flower or behold the starry heavens or think about the vast reaches of the universe.100
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Consequently, ‘when our epistemic powers are employed in the way God meant them to be, and when,
furthermore, they work in the way God intended them to work, the result is knowledge.’101 Plantinga
summarizes this contention as follows:
The correct picture of knowledge, then goes as follows: a belief constitutes knowledge, if it is
true, and if it arises as a result of the right use and proper functioning of our epistemic capacities.
Of course, this is only a picture, not a full-fledged account of knowledge. Of course there are
many hard questions to be asked and answered about it. But I do think it is the right picture.102
Plantinga continues to think that this is the right picture of knowledge. And much of his academic work
in the last 15 years have been focused on adding detail, color, and shading to this picture.

Conclusion
Plantinga’s work on religious epistemology at this stage is highly developed and sophisticated in
certain areas, and much more sketchy, even inchoate in others. During Stage II he articulated a powerful
and thought-provoking response to the evidentialist objection to belief in God. The minimalistic claim
that belief in God was permitted even if it was held in the basic way was sufficient to accomplish this
goal. His work is therefore an example of negative apologetics — defending the Christian faith by
undercutting an atheological argument. What Plantinga does not address at this stage is the connection
between his refutation of the evidentialist objection and the positive claim that belief in God was rational,
or could constitute knowledge. Therefore, what demarcates his early epistemology from his later is
precisely his effort to make this connection, and in so doing to distinguish merely true rational belief from
knowledge. The attempt to address the complex epistemological issues underlying Reformed
epistemology occupied much of Plantinga’s attention in the late 1980's and early 1990's, culminating with
the publication of the first two volumes of his Warrant trilogy. In the next chapter, I will discuss
Plantinga’s mature epistemology and his application of that epistemology to belief in God.
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